Monique David-Ménard has a double career, as a professor of philosophy and a practicing psychoanalyst. As the Director of the Centre d’études du vivant (2005-2011), she established the field of research “Gender and Sexualities” at the University Paris-Diderot/Paris 7. She has been invited to teach at a wide variety of universities wordwide: Ruhr University Bochum, Diego Portalès, Santiago de Chile, Universitad de Chile, Universitad de Sao Paulo, UNAM, Mexico, as well as Columbia University.

As a psychoanalyst, she has been a member of the Société de Psychanalyse Freudienne since its foundation in 1994. She is also a co-founder of the ISPP (International Society for Psychoanalysis and Philosophy) and a member of the International Network of Women Philosophers (UNESCO).

Selected Publications


  • Éloge des hasards dans la vie sexuelle (Paris: Hermann, 2011)
  • Deleuze et la psychanalyse: l’altercation (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2005)
    [German as Deleuze und die Psychoanalyse. Ein Streit, trans. by Franziska Schottmann (Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009)]
  • Tout le plaisir est pour moi (Paris: Hachette, 2000)
  • Les constructions de l’universel: psychanalyse, philosophie (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1997)
    [German as Konstruktionen des Allgemeinen: Psychoanalyse, Philosophie, trans. by Hans-Dieter Gondek (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 1999)]
  • La folie dans la raison pure: Kant lecteur de Swedenborg (Paris: Vrin, 1990)
  • L’hysterique entre Freud et Lacan: corps et langage en psychanalyse (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 1983)
    [English as Hysteria from Freud to Lacan: Body and Language in Psychoanalysis, trans. by Catherine Porter; foreword by Ned Lukacher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989)]

The Non-Conceptual Sources of Hegel’s Dialectic Logic

ICI Visiting Project 2015-16

During her visiting fellowship at the ICI Berlin, David-Ménard will explore the non-conceptual sources of G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectic logic. Her 1990 monograph La Folie dans la raison pure. Kant lecteur de Swedenborg pursued a similar question for the case of Immanuel Kant, pointing out the ways in which the invention of a new, non-ontological logic of negation (realer Konflikt) is related both to Kant’s critique of the formalism of Aristotle’s logic and to his fear of going mad like Emanuel Swedenborg.

The Kantian notions of the object and of a ‘transcendental logic’ are the result of this criss-crossing. The project on Hegel seeks to identify the decisive factors in his invention of the theory of negativity. Which factors are internal to the conceptual field and which are heterogeneous to this logical closure? To what extent can Hegel’s framework be seen as bound to what Deleuze and Guattari, in What is Philosophy?, have called ‘contingent reason’?